was readily applied to the understanding of mental and emotional abnormalities by psychiatrists (such as Jaspers himself) whose educational backgrounds encompassed both philosophy and the humanities. The empiricist and at times scientistic bias, along with the highly practical orientation of British and American mental health professionals, has in contrast given these professions a fairly atheoretical bias in the Anglophone world, rendering them allergic to philosophic speculation or extensive theoretical critique. There are signs this may be changing. The recent founding of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry and of the journal Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology suggest a burgeoning of interest in the more theoretical and self-critical approaches to the study of abnormality; at the same time philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition are increasingly attending to phenomena such as MPD, autism and neurological disorders such as blindsight.
The two books under review illustrate these trends. Philosophical Psychopathology is an anthology of articles by philosophers in the analytic tradition who address themselves to a disparate set of issues concerning psychopathology and psychotherapy. In Deconstructing Psychopathology, five British authors trained in psychoanalysis, psychology, discourse analysis and other fields offer a wide-ranging critique, from a politically and epistemologically radical perspective, of medical-model and other mainstream approaches to 'mental illness'-a concept whose validity they deny and whose political effects they deplore. Whereas the anthology exemplifies Anglo-American philosophical concern with topics in the philosophy of mind and epistemology, the co-authored book focuses on issues of social constructionism and power/knowledge inspired by such thinkers as Derrida and Foucault. Both books cover a great number of disparate topics, some of which are treated more effectively than others. In my review, I shall take the books one at a time, beginning with the anthology.
Philosophical Psychopathology
It is difficult to generalize about Philosophical Psychopathology, which, like most anthologies, contains articles that differ radically in quality as well as content. An introduction by the editors is followed by 12 chapters, covering particular disorders and symptoms (MPD, schizophrenia, autism, alcoholism; delusion, blindsight, visual agnosia) , issues of classification, the methodology of psychotherapy outcome research, and a potpourri of topics including the role of attention in psychiatric disorders, the dilemma of explaining (apparently) irrational action, and the problem of despair. Perhaps the only thing these essays share is a matter of intellectual style: with the exception of one psychiatrist-philosopher and one psychologist co-author, the authors are neither clinicians nor experts on psychopathology, but rather philosophers, trained in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, who seem to have come fairly recently to their interest in such issues. Many of the articles display characteristics one might therefore expect: admirable attempts at conceptual rigor with a concern to avoid contradiction and imprecision, but accompanied all too often by a distant and rather abstract grasp of the actual psychopathological experiences and behavior which they discuss. With such removal from clinical realities, it is perhaps not surprising that concepts sometimes come to be treated in an almost reified manner. Readers with clinical experience or an interest in phenomenological or existential philosophy may be frustrated by the lack of attention given to the texture and feel of experience as actually lived by the patient.
Although several of the articles are written with clarity and grace, others are composed in the hyperabstract, often colorless prose commonly found in journals of analytic philosophy. This austere style is often defended as necessary given the conceptual demands of the philosophical task; yet to this reader, at least, it sometimes seemed to have an obscuring rather than clarifying effect. But it is difficult to generalize about so varied a volume. Instead let me try to convey the main points of a number of the articles, along with some editorializing of my own.
In one of the most satisfying pieces, 'Deficit Studies and the Function of Phenomenal Consciousness', Robert Van Gulick argues that certain neurological phenomena-specifically blindsight and visual agnosia-are potentially relevant to addressing the mind-body problem that has bedeviled philosophers for centuries; and that a proper understanding of such phenomena runs counter to the pessimism of certain philosophers (notably Colin McGinn and John Searle) who doubt that we could ever understand the functional organization or physical basis of consciousness. Van Gulick disputes those who interpret blindsight (the apparent registering of visual stimuli without phenomenal awareness) as showing the irrelevance of consciousness to psychological functioning. Despite impressive performance by blindsighted subjects in forced-choice discrimination situations, Van Gulick reminds us that there are various kinds of activities in which such subjects do not engage. This shows, he argues, that information needs 'to be presented to us phenomenally for it to play a role in the choice, initiation, or direction of intentional action ' (p. 33) , and that without phenomenal awareness we do not experience objects 'in relationship to ourselves' (e.g. seeing a telephone 'in front of me at the very moment causing my present visual awareness of it ' [p. 34] ). In his opinion, blindsight lends support to views about the significance of phenomenal awareness that are already suggested by introspection: namely, that such awareness plays a highly synthesizing or integrative role, allowing situations, plans, goals and capacities to be united; and he suggests that this important integrating of psychological processes may be mediated by the simultaneous firing of distinct groups of neurons oscillating in concert. SASS: PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 259 In a chapter called 'The Problem of Despair', Richard Garrett assesses the rationality of depressive attitudes. Notwithstanding empirical evidence of 'depressive realism'-i.e. greater accuracy of depressed as against nondepressed individuals in judging the amount of control they had or success they could expect in certain experimental situations-Garrett argues that depressives are actually less rational and realistic in their overall orientation or attitude toward life: Despite greater accuracy in assessing isolated aspects of themselves or their situations, they view the larger picture in an excessively, and unrealistically, negative light. Also, they adopt attitudes whose self-fulfilling nature renders it difficult to achieve happiness or engage in socially useful action; and this, he suggests, hardly seems the rational thing to do: '. . . what they miss is the larger picture, the larger truth that in general it is better to trust themselves, the world, and the future than not to ' (p. 88) .
Garrett views his arguments as vindicating Aaron Beck's view that depression results from irrational or illogical patterns of reasoning, and as supporting Beck's emphasis on changing negative beliefs in treating depression. Like Beck's, Garrett's views are highly rationalistic, perhaps reflecting (in his case) a bias congenial to analytic philosophy. He appears to be unaware of recent research which shows that negative beliefs or thoughts are as much a product as a cause of depression, a product that can be diminished through purely non-cognitive forms of treatment. This research, as summarized and analyzed in the important writings of the cognitive-behaviorist Teasdale (1997) , actually tends to undermine the founding premises concerning science and human nature that pervade both cognitivism and behaviorism (a point that Teasdale, himself a product of the cognitivebehaviorist tradition, does not fully recognize). As Teasdale shows, this work forces upon us a greater appreciation of the pervasive, allencompassing, moodlike and often ineffable aspects of human existence. These are, in fact, the very aspects captured in Martin Heidegger's notions of the horizonal or ontological dimensions of human existence. To fully recognize the significance of this dimension would require deeper appreciation of many of the paradoxes and ambiguities of human existence that have been explored in continental philosophy, and this would demand a confrontation with the philosophical writings of such thinkers as Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.
In light of such philosophical writings, Garrett's confident dismissal of the rationality of a pessimistic or tragic attitude toward life seems rather simplistic at best, as it does not recognize (among other things) the essential ambiguity or heterogeneity of notions of 'rationality'. Thus Garrett fails to take into account possible notions of the good or meaningful life that emphasize depth of understanding, insight or recognition of the tragic dimension of human existence, even at the expense of happiness or functioning in the practical world; and this general attitude, rather than the THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 9(2) 260 awareness of certain isolated facts, may underlie the 'depressive realism' characteristic of some individuals.
In an interesting article called 'Mind and Mine', George Graham and Lynn Stephens, the volume editors, discuss instances of what they term 'introspective alienation'-experiences in which the subject retains awareness of the subjective nature of a given mental event, that is, its occurrence in the subject's own stream of awareness, but nevertheless loses the sense of being the agent or intentional center who is responsible for or otherwise controls that event. The most obvious examples are instances of so-called 'thought insertion' in schizophrenia, as described by the following patient quoted in Mellor's (1970) Graham and Stephens are concerned to distinguish introspective alienation from symptoms that involve loss of an accurate sense of ego boundaries, where actual subjective or inner events may be experienced as occurring in the external world. Only symptoms effacing ego boundaries truly fit the standard definition of hallucination or delusion. Instances of introspective alienation are more common than may be supposed, given that (as various authors have noted) in many instances of what are misleadingly termed auditory hallucination, the patient actually experiences his or her 'voices' as more akin to inner speech than to auditory perception of another's speech. This distinction between such alienation and ego-boundary disturbance is not new; it is frequently mentioned in the classic psychopathological literature and is central to the arguments made by a variety of recent authors, including myself (Sass, 1992 ; see also Frith & Done, 1988; Spitzer, 1988) . Graham and Stephens do a good job of clarifying the issue, and of specifying the rather unusual experiences to be accounted for.
I am less impressed with their attempt to explain the phenomenon by invoking the notion of self-referential narratives put forth by Daniel Dennett (1991) and others. Graham and Stephens hypothesize that thought or propositions which are felt to be subjective, yet alien, are those which have enough sense of coherence to seem attributable to someone's conscious intent but do not readily fit into the patient's own, quasi-intentional sense of his or her own pattern of wishes, plans or intentions. This hypothesis appears to make the (to my mind) rather implausible assumption that thought generally involves at least two separate phases: one in which the thought is generated, and a later stage in which its congruence with other thoughts and intentions is assessed and somehow registered:
What we are suggesting is that the subject unproblematically accepts a thought as her action if, by her own lights, it accords with her intentional psychology-if roughly, it is the sort of thought she would expect herself to think given her picture of her self. (p. 103) Also, Graham and Stephens' hypothesis is not very congruent with what might be termed the immediacy of the experience of alienation in schizophrenia, which does not appear to be a matter of interpretation or selfrepresentation so much as an unquestionable lived reality. (That is, the experience is not akin to an interpretration that is subject to one's will, nor even to the half-automatic/half-intentional phenomena that Wittgenstein [1953] called 'seeing-as'; it is more like those experiences in which, according to Wittgenstein, interpretation plays no role at all-as, e.g., when I simply see a fork as a fork or a human face as a human face.) The selfinterpretation hypothesis offered by Graham and Stephens seems particularly dubious if applied to instances of alienation that involve simple, everyday actions such as raising a finger or moving an arm to pick up a glass, given that actions of this kind hardly seem likely to involve a prominent interpretative or self-representational element involving a person's self-image or life-narrative. In addition, it is significant that Graham and Stephens take no account of the interesting (and in psychiatry wellknown) views of the British psychologist C.D. Frith, who has offered an intriguing neurobiological explanation for this diminution or loss of a sense of intentional possession or control over both thought and action (a diminution which Frith ascribes to dysfunction of a neural pathway that normally provides feedback concerning the existence of willed intentions; see Frith & Done, 1988) .
Finally, as Graham and Stephens acknowledge, their theory-the selfnarrative account-is not able to explain why certain thoughts or kinds of thoughts, and not just any thoughts, tend to be experienced by schizophrenics as verbal hallucinations or as quasi-voices rather than as experiences belonging fully to the self. The most typical 'voices' are those which address themselves to the patient, or which criticize, comment on or discuss the patient's ongoing action and experience (see Mellor, 1970) . Graham and Stephens cannot explain why these particular 'voices' are experienced as incongruent with the patient's picture of him-or herself. As I have argued elsewhere, however (Sass, 1992, pp. 213-267; , close phenomenological examination shows that the experience of schizophrenic persons is often dominated by an exaggerated and debilitating self-consciousness; such voices can be understood as reifications of this all-permeating selfconsciousness (a self-consciousness that may be, in part, a product of neurobiological factors such as those postulated by Frith-although it should be noted that Frith's hypothesis, taken by itself, does not account for the typical content of these voices). Phenomenological analysis suggests that such self-consciousness, a kind of introspection, is inherently alienating:
This is because the act of observing tends to objectify, externalize or reify what is observed; when what is being observed is thinking itself, this (usually) most intimate part of the self can seem to exist at a remove from one's own intentionality. And if one's consciousness (which is usefully imagined in Vygotskian terms: as an internalization of some form of dialogue) is already dominated by self-consciousness, then among the inner quasi-voices that come to be externalized will be the voice of selfconsciousness itself; hence the voice of self-consciousness can itself be experienced as an alien Other-in the form of alien voices that comment or criticize.
Four other articles stand out as worthy of particular note and underscore the wide variation in content across the volume. In an article on multiple personality, Owen Flanagan discusses whether the self is best considered a purely fictive entity, as implied in Daniel Dennett's (1991) description of it as a 'center of narrative gravity' and also by many postmodernist arguments. While acknowledging several respects in which the self does seem fictive, Flanagan concludes that it cannot be purely fictional because there are various real-world constraints which limit the narrational possibilities available to a given individual. Also, putting too much emphasis on fictiveness seems to deprive the very notion of self-deception of any meaning-a price Flanagan is unwilling to pay. In another interesting article, 'Autism and the "Theory of Mind" Debate', Robert Gordon and John Barker criticize the view that autistic children lack a 'theory of mind', resulting in their severely diminished psychological competence. Instead, they argue that the autist's psychological competence is best understood as a deficiency of skill-of the ability to engage in spontaneous pretend play, a prerequisite for understanding other individuals.
In 'Value, Illness, and Failure of Action', K.W.M. Fulford, who is both a psychiatrist and a philosopher, offers a useful and compelling critique of standard textbook accounts of delusion as false belief by pointing out, for example, that a belief can be a delusion without being false (or, to reverse an old saying: just because they're out to get you, doesn't mean you're not paranoid). Fulford mentions the case of a man who had tried to kill himself because he was afraid he would be locked up: At the heart of his paranoid, hypochondriacal system was the delusion that he was mentally ill, a belief that was true yet had the quality of delusion nonetheless. He makes a convincing argument for the need to pay closer attention to the patient's experience of illness, and to accept the necessarily evaluative nature of many psychiatric judgments. Finally, a rather different criticism of standard approaches, in this case of the DSM method of classifying psychopathology, is offered in an article by Jeffrey Poland, Barbara von Eckardt and Will Spaulding. They argue that the usefulness of the DSM, for clinical as well as scientific-research purposes, is vitiated by the DSM's reliance on the dubious assumption that the operationally defined categories within the system constitute "natural kinds" with a characteristic causal structure' (p. 241). In their view, available evidence suggests that the domain of psychopathology is characterized by massive heterogeneity, with individuals who fall within a category varying significantly on important biological, psychological and behavioral dimensions. Further, the relevant psychological processes or attributes referred to in the DSM are highly context-dependent and may result from any number of different factors.
In putting together this interesting collection of essays, Graham and Stephens have performed an important service. It is a promising beginning, and one hopes their volume will inspire much further work at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry. The shortcomings of these articles are understandable, given how little interaction there has been between philosophers and mental health professionals in the English-speaking world.
Deconstructing Psychopathology
The second book, Deconstructing Psychopathology, is not a tightly argued treatise or focused essay, but a wide-ranging compendium of what might be termed the received ideas of the radical wing of the mental health professions. The five co-authors are explicit about intending to produce a combination textbook/user's-manual/reference-work. For such a book, lucidity and directness of expression are crucial; but though the book is reasonably clear, its prose is at best workmanlike and sometimes awkward. The book does not argue but simply presupposes that psychiatry is fundamentally an oppressive institution, biased along race, class and gender lines; and more than once one detects a true-believer tone in the employment of poststructuralist clichés, a tone that has the unfortunate effect of vitiating many of the valuable points the authors wish to make. In keeping with the book's practical intent, its final pages list 'resources for change': groups or networks that adopt a critical, activist stance toward current mental health institutions. This is a 'counter-text' (p. 135) written for activists who wish to deconstruct (in every sense of the word) existing mental health institutions and replace them with something less oppressive and alienating.
Deconstructing Psychopathology begins with a brief and diffuse overview of the historical development of concepts of madness. There is mention of Foucault's Madness and Civilization; there are remarks on the influence of psychological ideas on the prevalent forms of selfhood and psychological distress; passing reference is made to the West's tendency to set madness off against images of a self-conscious and unitary rational ego. These historical perspectives are supposed to show the profound influence language has on our conceptualizations of mental illness, conceptualizations said to be particularly oppressive to women and to people of color. The subsequent chapter discusses several alternatives to medical-model psychiatry: psycho-THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 9 (2) 264 analysis, anti-psychiatry, family therapy and cognitive approaches. Though each of these deviates in significant and potentially liberating ways from mainstream psychiatry, each is also deeply implicated in what the authors see as the same oppressive regime of truth. Thus psychoanalysis, which evades the sharp distinction between normal and abnormal, nevertheless fosters traditional power relations by placing the analyst in the role of expert and by forcing patients to continually second-guess and recant everything they say.
The next three chapters develop the idea that psychiatric concepts and diagnostic categories do not so much describe an independently existing universe as they create or constitute a new realm of existence by carving out and reifying a set of pathological pseudo-entities: 'We would argue that we will continue to run into problems if we believe that such diagnoses are simply descriptive of reality "out there",' write the authors. 'Rather, these categories are constitutive. In other words, the existence of these categories actually creates these problems' (p. 39). Psychiatric discourses 'construct the phenomena they claim to discover ' (p. 115) .
The key terms here are 'constitute' and 'construct', and as usual these words are ambiguous between ontological and epistemological readings: They could refer to the actual bringing into existence of certain forms of human action and experience or, more modestly, to the creation, out of the flux of human variety, of conceptual groupings of symptoms or persons not previously recognized as composing a single type. These usages need not be mutually exclusive. Indeed, part of the point of the Foucauldian notion of power/knowledge (which pervades Deconstructing Psychopathology) is precisely to question this difference, to make us recognize that how we see the human world actually has an effect on what this world is like. Of course, Foucault himself is not above eliding this difference for rhetorical purposes and in accord with his love of the bouleversement effect-as when he speaks of the invention of sexuality or the disappearance of Man. But, at least in his more circumspect moments, Foucault did not conflate the two meanings. By contrast, Parker et al. tend to push a more ontological reading of what it means to constitute a psychiatric category; indeed at times it almost seems they believe that such problems as schizophrenia and psychopathy would simply disappear if only we ceased to employ the concepts that allow us to describe them.
Contrary to what Parker et al. sometimes imply, there is actually no necessary opposition between a scientific stance and one that emphasizes the constituting of one's object of study: That the observer is required to abstract away any number of features of an object in order to create an appropriate scientific object will come as no surprise to any reasonably self-reflective working scientist. The real question is not whether scientific or psychiatric categories are constructed-of course they are-but whether they may for this very reason single out aspects or features of the world that do have something important in common. Parker and his co-authors seem, however, to see all psychiatric concepts as the enemy; their animus against psychiatric classification leads them, for example, to assume virtually without argument that one psychopathic patient's rejection of his or her diagnostic label should be seen as some kind of heroic gesture of resistance (p. 90).
The authors' approach comes into its own, however, in the chapter called 'Psychotic Discourse'-by far the strongest section of the book; here the concept of (formal) thought disorder is subjected to a scathing and, in large measure, convincing analysis. As a psychiatric concept or symptomatic notion, 'thought disorder' ranks second only to delusion in its nosological significance and theoretical centrality to the field; but it turns out to be extremely problematic when examined from a conceptual or definitional point of view. As Parker et al. note, the rubric 'thought disorder' is often reified and taken as referring to some underlying essence, but it actually subsumes a wide variety of linguistic, communicational and behavioral phenomena that do not all involve processes of thinking or even of language; that do not, in fact, have much of anything in common. Indeed, upon reflection, it is fairly obvious that 'thought disorder' is really a normative concept, actually a negative normative concept, for it involves not the presence of any essential characteristic so much as the absence of some illdefined norm-the average or standard way of thinking or speaking.
As Parker et al. point out, the psychiatric research and clinical literature frequently ignores this fact and lacks serious or well-informed discussion of just what the so-called thought-disordered speech deviates from. Also, there is often little attempt to distinguish between inherent properties of a speech sample and the effect it produces on a listener. What is really being described in most studies of thought disorder is the effect of speech on the listener, but the very term 'thought disorder' tends to obscure or suppress the highly contextual and judgment-dependent nature of what is being described. In reality, as Parker et al. note, 'a text cannot be said to be simply incoherent; it is incoherent to a particular listener in a specific situation' (p. 99). The best example I know of the failure to recognize the last point occurs in the scoring of Rorschach protocols: Often, what is coded as 'autistic logic' need not involve a disturbance of logic at all, but simply a failure to provide sufficient information for the listener readily to follow the point being made. And this failure to provide information is hardly a unitary phenomenon, for it can result from any number of factors, including general cognitive egocentricity but also lack of concern about being understood, willful obscurity, contempt for or indifference to the listener, or a tendency to imagine others as more intimate with oneself than is really the case.
Parker et al. are perfectly correct to point out that 'thought disorder' is far too often reified or treated as containing some (often unspecified) underlying essence, not only by clinicians but also by more than a few researchers and theorists who ought to know better. Unfortunately, the authors' adamant, THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 9(2) 266
